NOTES by unknown
NOTES
available to the justices of the Supreme Court, it is indeed unfortunate that
by denying certiorari they failed to publicize it
47
DENIAL OF REORGANIZATION PROFITS ON BONDS
PURCHASED BY INSIDERS DURING INSOLVENCY*
SINCE 1929, opportunities for corporate insiders to exploit innocent security
holders and to frustrate the workings of a free and open securities market have
been sharply curtailed." Directors and officers may be stripped of profits
earned through short-term speculation in the stock of the companies they
manage.2 They may be compelled to surrender profits derived from trading
47. The Supreme Court will have another opportunity to review §404(c). Lapides
has filed a petition for rehearing based primarily upon the discovery of a letter represent-
ing as the view of the State Department "that subsection (c) of Section 404 of the Na-
tionality Act does not serve the interests of the United States.' Communication to Senator
Francis J. Meyers from .... Assistant Secretary of State, dated July 15, 1947, according
to Petition for Rehearing, p. 7, Lapides v. McGrath, 18 U.S.L. AWnK 3129 (U.S. Oct. 25,
1949).
Another case contesting the constitutionality of §404(c) has started in the lower
courts. Mendelsohn v. Acheson, No. 2390-49, D.D.C. 1949.
*1n re Calton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd sub isom. Manufacturers
Trust Co. v. Becker, 18 U.S.L. NzVEE 4025 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1949).
1. Between 1933 and 1940, a series of federal statutes brought the securities market
and the field of investment under comprehensive control. Each of these acts contained
specific provisions regulating insider trading. Following the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 -, 9 and 16, 48 STAT. 889, 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§78i, 7Sp (1946), Congress enacted
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 17, 49 STAT. 830 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
§ 79q (1946), the Chandler Act of 1933 §§ 212 and 249, 52 STA'. 895, 901 (1933), 11 U.S.C.
§§612, 649 (1946), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 §310, 53 SrTr. 1157 (1939), 15
U.S.C. § 77jjj (1946), and the Investment Control Act of 1940 § 10, 54 STAT. 806 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1946). The sorry record of insider speculation unearthed in Con-
gressional and later SEC investigations furnished a strong argument for such regulation.
See Hearings before Comnmittee on Banking and Ctirrency on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and
S. Res. 97, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1933-4) ; SEC, REPOaT
ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF TEE VoR, AcrivTmzs, PErtsONNEL AND FuNCTIors
OF PROTECTrVE AND REORGANIZATION CourxrEEs, pt. I, 315-51 (1937) (cited hereafter
as SEC REPORT).
2. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1946),
allows a corporation whose equity securities are registered on a national exchange to re-
cover from any officer or director profits from "any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer... within... less than six months... ."
Identical restrictions apply to officers and directors of public utility holding companies.
49 STAT. 830 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79q (1946). The constitutionality of § 16(b) w-as upheld
in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 32-0 U.S. 751
(1943). See generally Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers, and Stoch-
holders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 ficir. L REv. 133 (1939).
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in the corporation's securities during Chapter X reorganizations.3 But the
Second Circuit decided in the recent Calton Crescent4 case that speculation
by insiders in the securities of an insolvent corporation before reorganization
is not similarly proscribed.
Calton Crescent, Inc., a small corporation, was insolvent in the bankruptcy
sense: its liabilities exceeded its assets. Since its organization in 1933, it had
consistently failed to meet the interest on its obligations. Continual operating
deficits led its officers to undertake negotiations for sale of the apartment house
which constituted its sole asset. During this period, one of its directors ad-
vised his wife, his mother, and a business associate to invest in the corpora-
tion's outstanding indebtedness. Altogether these three purchased 60% of the
corporation's $250,000 of debenture bonds, many in over-the-counter trans-
actions for about 6% of par. Subsequently, the apartment house was sold,
and a petition for a voluntary arrangement under Chapter XI was filed. The
ensuing cash settlement at 43.6% of par which was awarded to participating
bondholders yielded these insiders a 500% profit. On behalf of other bond-
holders, the indenture trustee objected to allowance of the insiders' claims,5
alleging that they had substantial reason to foresee the high sale price ulti-
mately received by the insolvent corporation.0 Furthermore, he alleged that
recognizing speculative profits from bonds purchased during insolvency con-
doned an intolerable conflict of interest between directors as fiduciaries and
directors as speculators.7 Consequently, he urged the bankruptcy court to
invoke its power to subordinate and limit these claims to the actual purchase
price of the bonds.
8
3. Bankruptcy Act § 212, 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1946). Although
§ 212 speaks of "agent, attorney, indenture trustee or committee," directors and officers
seem to fall within its sanction. See In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp.
77, 92 (S.D. Cal. 1941). Speculating fiduciaries may be denied compensation as well as
profits under § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1946).
4. In re Calton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949).
5. If the insiders had been denied their 500% profit, other bondholders would have
received a 94% return on the face value of their claims. 173 F.2d 944, 947 (2d Cir. 1949).
6. 173 F2d 944, 947-9 (2d Cir. 1949).
7. This argument was actually introduced and developed by the SEC, an amklcils
curiae in the proceedings. Brief of the SEC, pp. 10-12. The indenture trustee relied
heavily upon precedents in the federal courts barring the claims of directors speculating
after reorganizations had begun or been authorized, e.g., In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d
407 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 625 (1940) (company already in receivership) ;
In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (reorganization
already authorized by directors). The claimants argued that these and other cases cited
by the trustee could be distinguished. In all of them, some form of bankruptcy proceedings
were already in process at the time of purchase. Apparently, the court was satisfied that
this factor made the cases cited by the trustee inapplicable. See 173 F.2d 944, 950 n.11
(2d Cir. 1949).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 336, 52 STAT. 908 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 736 (1946), specifically
authorizes such action in Chapter XI proceedings. The judge or referee may disallow
or modify claims on the basis of fraud in the acquisition, violation of fiduciary duty, or
inadequate consideration. MooRE & OGLEBAY, CoIuaATE REORGANIZATION § 9.04 (1948).
The bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, has inherent power to prevent overreaching,
however subtle. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-8 (1939).
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Judge Swan, spealing for a majority, conceded that a director should not
profit at the expense of the corporation from transactions where duty and
personal interest conflict.9 Thus, a director who buys up bonds at a discount
without first offering the insolvent corporation an opportunity to purchase
them may be compelled to forfeit subsequent profits.10 In the Calton Cresccni
case, however, the corporation had no funds available for repurchasing its own
bonds; hence, the director's activities did not compete with the corporation's
attempts to settle its indebtedness. 1 Furthermore, bond purchases by cor-
porate directors during solvency are permissible.'-' The court saw no reason
why the mere fact of insolvency warranted judicial interference with this prac-
tice.13 Moreover, since loans by these insiders had staved off bankruptcy until
9. 173 F2d 944, 949 (2d Cir. 1949). Of course, corporation directors, like trustees,
are not supposed to use fiduciary powers to enhance their own profits at the expense of
the corporation's welfare. See, e.g., Bosworth v. Allen, 163 N.Y. 157, 165, 61 N.E. 163
(1901).
10. See, e.g., In re Jersey Materials Co., 50 F. Supp. 428, 430 (D.N.J. 1943). Many
of the cases cited by the trustee in the Calton Crescent case for the proposition that di-
rectors may not profit from purchases during insolvency involved situations in which the
director competed with the corporation in the purchase of its claims, e.g., In re McCrory
Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (debtor corporation still trying to settle
indebtedness at time directors purchased claims).
11. The referee justified this conclusion on the ground that there vas no retirement
fund or liquidation project for the repurchase of the bonds at the time the insiders pur-
chased. In re Calton Crescent, 80 F. Supp. 822, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). When the cor-
poration is unable to repurchase its indebtedness, directors are at liberty to purchase the
claims. See, e.g., Punch v. Hipolite Co., 340 Mo. 53, 71, 100 SAV2d 878, 887 (1936).
But cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cort. dcnicd, 294 U.S.
708 (1934). See generally Fuller, Restrictions Iniposed by the Directorship Status on
Personl Business Activities of Directors, 26 WVAsm L. REv. 189 (1941).
12. Seymour v. Spring Forest Cenetery Assn., 144 N.Y. 333, 39 N. . 365 (1895).
Judge Learned Hand, dissenting in the Calton Crescat case, argued that courts permit
directors to trade in the corporation's securities only because they believe that the personal
interest of corporate directors as security holders coincides with the interest of the cor-
poration-both benefit from the corporation's success. This incentive to good manage-
ment, however, is of little value if the corporation is inevitably headed toward liquidation.
Consequently, Judge Hand would allow directors to profit from purchases during in-
solvency only on a showing that their purchases were motivated by a reasonable confidence
in the corporation's ability to recover and remain in business. Even under this test, many
of the purchases in the Calton Crescent case could not be justified. 173 F2d. 944, 951-2
(2d Cir. 1949).
But students of business administration question the correlation between incentive and
security ownership. They cite the trend in executive compensation away from stock option
and purchase plans toward substantial salaries and pensions, and the increasing emphasis
upon compensation methods that stress the long-run professional aspects of the job rather
than the short-term speculative ones. At least one authority has concluded: "[T]oday
under existing corporate organization, there need not be any mutuality of interest between
the ownership group-the stockholders-and the management control group-the execu-
tives. Baker, Icentive Compensation Plans for Executives, 15 HAnv. Bus. Rnv. 44
(1936).
13. Many state courts, however, have reached a different conclusion when matured
claims were involved. See, e.g., Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land & Lumber Co., 26 Ky.
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the corporation could sell its asset at a more favorable price, the court hesi-
tated to penalize the insiders' actions in buying up the bonds.14 In the absence
of convincing proof that specific inside information had been used,1 all claims
were allowed in full.1 6
The opinion in the Calton Crescent case, however, fails to assess properly
the impact of insolvency upon a director's responsibilities to the corporation
and to other bondholders17 An insolvent corporation finds several avenues of
financial relief available: private negotiations with creditors, repurchase of
debts at a discount, voluntary reorganization or bankruptcy. Directors who
engage in insider trading endanger the possible success of any of these reme-
dies. Creditors are likely to suspect the motives of directors who speculate in
claims against the corporation during negotiations for a general scaling down
of its debts.' 8 If opportunities arise for the corporation to repurchase its
Law Rep. 1176, 1179, 83 S.W. 599, 602 (1904) (president's acquisition of corporate prop-
erty at foreclosure sale by use of judgment purchased at discount during insolvency).
Similarly, there is a prevailing belief in the federal courts that such conduct by corporate
fiduciaries is reprehensible. See, e.g., Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725, 728 (10th Cir.
1943). But such cases often involve foreclosure on matured obligations, a more obvious
misuse of position than the mere receipt of reorganization dividends.
14. The trustee's allegation of overreaching was based upon the failure of the insiders
to disclose (1) their identity as relatives of the director, and owners of the mortgage on
the corporation's asset and (2) the fact that brokers had been making frequent inquiries
about terms of sale of the property. Though many of the purchases were solicited in the
name of a brother-in-law of one of the claimants, the court hesitated "to lay down the rule
that the purchaser from a broker must make disclosure of why he thinks the purchase a
desirable investment -under penalty of being charged with overreaching if he falls to do so."
173 F2d 944, 949 (2d Cir. 1949). And the referee made a finding of no concealment on
the grounds that no "firm offer" had been received for the property at the time the bonds
were purchased. Id. at 949 n.9. The trustee's failure to prove this allegation of over-
reaching illustrates the difficulties that await exploited sellers trying to recover by stilts
for fraudulent misrepresentation. See note 27 infra. 1
15. 173 F.2d 944, 948 (2d. Cir. 1949). In return for the loans, the claimants received
a second mortgage, power to name two of the five directors of the corporation, and the
managing agent of the property, and later an assignment of the rents from the apartment
house.
16. The court then went on to decide that even if they imposed an equitable restriction
on trading activities of directors during insolvency, the restriction would not extend to
members of the directors' families purchasing for themselves with their own funds. 173
F.2d. 944, 950-1 (2d Cir. 1949). Any sanction upon directors so easily by-passed would
be no sanction at all. See MooRE & OGLEBAY, CORPORATr RVORGA141ZATION § 13.18 (1948),
The authors advocate strict application of the existing sanctions of Chapter X (see note 3
supra) to the confederates of speculating fiduciaries in view of "the rigorous purpose of
the statute, and the realities of life."
17. Some commentators have argued that insolvency only reinforces the desirability
of bond purchases by insiders during insolvency to the extent that these purchases enhance
the credit reputation of the debtor corporation and forestall bankruptcy proceedings. E.g.,
62 HA v. L. Ray. 1391, 1392 (1949). But see notes 18-20 infra.
18. Many "friendly adjustments" are made in the case of small corporations through
the intervention of credit bureaus. But reputable credit bureaus will accept only "honest
debtors." Knowledge that directors are speculating in creditors' claims would cast strong
suspicion upon the debtor's honesty, and very likely preclude this form of relief. See
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bonds at a discount, directors must pass upon the advisability of using limited
corporate resources for this purpose. Here, the fact that insiders too may buy
these bonds at a discount and enforce them for their face amount in reorganiza-
tion may persuade directors to decide that the corporation lacks the necessary
funds and to slacken their efforts at raising additional capital for the corpora-
tion.19 Finally, where reorganization or liquidation is necessary, the choice of
an appropriate time for filing a petition may materially affect the success of
the proceeding and the amount of the settlement.2 0 Unwarranted delays only
add to mounting deficits and increase dissatisfaction among creditors. Yet the
possibility of reorganization or liquidation settlements above existing market
prices may cause directors to postpone filing a petition until they have acquired
substantial amounts of the bonds.
Individual bondholders, too, become peculiarly vulnerable to exploitation at
the hands of an unscrupulous insider during insolvency. Few investors ever
share the director's access to the corporation's financial secrets. But at least
the value of a solvent2 ' corporation's obligation can be largely determined by
Mulder & Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act upon General Assignmncnts and Composi-
tiows, 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 763 n.1 (1939). It is especially necessary to avoid any sus-
picion of directors' motives where the debtor corporation seeks an arrangement in state
courts. Since state courts cannot constitutionally compel creditors to accept any plan, one
disgruntled or suspicious creditor can upset the whole scheme by resorting to other legal
processes to collect his claims in full. MOORE & OorLEAY, ConroPa'z REonGAjnzATxoi
§ 0.02 (1948).
19. See Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d. Cir. 1934). "The defend-
ant's argument that the equitable rule that fiduciaries should not be permitted to assume a
position in which their individual interests might be in conflict with those of the corpora-
tion can have no application where the corporation is unable to undertake the venture, is
not convincing. If directors are permitted to justify their conduct on such a theory, there
will be a temptation to refrain from exerting their strongest efforts on behalf of the cor-
poration since, if it does not meet the obligations, an opportunity for profit will be open
to them personally." Although the corporation involved in the Irving case was solvent,
the same reasoning should apply to insolvent corporations. For instance, the directors
may be tempted to manipulate financial statements in order to justify their conclusion that
the corporation cannot afford the purchases. And courts are familiar with misrepresenta-
tion of corporate assets by speculating directors. See, e.9., McDonald v. Haughton, 70
N.C. 393, 399 (1874).
20. Voluntary reorganization delayed too long may involve the corporation in state
receivership suits by individual creditors or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings at the
instigation of the indenture trustee. For examples of the disastrous results of fiduciary
inaction under these circumstances, see S=zn, BoirDs VrrHOUT SAnry 65-70 (1932);
SEC REPORT, pt. VI, 80-109 (1936) and pt. I, 329-41 (1937). Unwarranted delays in
foreclosures by speculating indenture trustees led to restrictions in the Trust Indenture
Act of 1940 limiting the amount and kind of an issuer's securities a trustee may own, 53
STAT. 1157 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (1946) and requiring him to exercise his indenture
powers on default of bond interest, 53 STAT. 1171 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1946). In the
Calton Crescent case, the directors filed a petition for an arrangement several months after
the sale of its sole asset and only after unfriendly proceedings in a state court had begun.
Communication to YALE LAW JouaxAL from Edvard K. Hanlon, counsel for Manufac-
turers Trust Co., May 16, 1949.
21. "Solvent" in this context assumes that the corporation has a reliable reputation
and earnings record.
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such matters as security, interest rate, amount of principal, and time of ma-
turity.22 A bondholder may judge the adequacy of the price offered for his
securities with a fair degree of accuracy.23 In contrast, the obligation of an
insolvent corporation may be highly speculative. Interest payments are often
in default, trading at a minimum, and the sale price of the bonds nominal.
2 '
In deciding whether to retain or liquidate his holdings, a bondholder must often
rely upon his own judgment concerning the corporation's chances of regaining
solvency and the imminence of reorganization or liquidation.25 Yet the in-
formation necessary for enlightened judgment lies uniquely within the direc-
tor's knowledge and control. The director decides if bond interest shall be
paid or defaulted, whether and when voluntary reorganization or liquidation
shall be undertaken. Moreover, he is in the most favored position to estimate
the amount of ensuing settlements. He can most easily capitalize on the ig-
norance and insecurity of his fellow-bondholders.
By refusing to disallow the insiders' claims, the reorganization court in the
Calton Crescent case relegated bondholders to their traditional remedies in
suits for fraudulent misrepresentation, where the road to recovery is strewn
with obstacles. Very often the exploited bondholder cannot even identify the
purchaser of his securities ;26 rarely can he prove the use of specific inside in-
formation affecting the value of the securities ;27 seldom can a small investor
afford the expenses of a lawsuit.
22. BADGER & GUTHMANN, INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 912 (1938).
23. Price fluctuations in high-grade bonds are usually narrow compared with variations
in stock prices. Original holders may ordinarily sell their bonds at a later date for ap-
proximately what they paid for them. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, Tim SERCU TI
MARKETS 76 (lf35).
24. WARRINGTON, NATURE AND EXTENT OF LOSSES TO BONDHOLDERS IN CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION AND LIQUIDATION 164 (1936). Moreover, when a corporation becomes
insolvent, its securities are dropped from the Exchanges and traded exclusively on the
over-the-counter market. The loss of open market price quotations creates a larger area
for unfair use of inside information. See Rubin & Feldman, Stalutory Inhibitions Upon
Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 468, 496 (1947).
25. WARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 162, concludes from his survey of bond-
holders' losses that their best chance of recovering investments usually lies in participation
in reorganization. Modern specialization of industrial equipment makes liquidation fitnan-
cially disastrous. But, if reorganization is unreasonably delayed or prolonged, the bond-
holder in need of cash has little choice but to sell his holdings for a small fraction of par.
26. SEC Regulation X-15C1-4 (SEC Release No. 1330, 1937) requires an over-the-
counter dealer acting as broker to disclose to his customers the name of the other party
to the security transaction. But fiduciaries may purchase through the accounts of their
relative and friends, as some of the insiders did in the Calton Crescent case. 173 F.2d 944,
948 (2d Cir. 1949). Moreover, if the transactions are conducted between two over-the-
counter dealers, the identities of the ultimate purchaser and seller need not be disclosed at
all. Yet complete disclosure of identity and personal interest has been considered a major
element of "arm's length bargaining" in security transactions. See Strong v. Repide, 213
U.S. 419, 432-3 (1909); American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S.
138, 145 (1940).
27. Use of inside information can ordinarily be proved only by circumstantial evi-
dence. In reorganizations, however, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between use of
inside information and early recognition of economic trends. See SEC REPORT, pt. II,
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If it is a sound proposition that insider trading during insolvency should
be discouraged, investors deserve greater protection. Ex.sting regulations
already make it unlawful for any person to engage in practices which operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any other person in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security2 8 These might be supplemented by a specific requirement
that corporations publish any information affecting the value of their securities
before management officials could purchase.- Courts already demand that a
director prove complete disclosure of personal interest and adequate considera-
tion in his dealings with the corporation.30 A similar burden might be im-
posed on corporate insiders in their dealings with individual bondholders.31
While this burden might pave the way for a myriad of nuisance suits by dis-
gruntled security-holders, it would deter insiders from trading during in-
solvency when the affairs of the insolvent corporation never come under the
surveillance of the bankruptcy court.
Many insolvent corporations, however, like Calton Crescent, Inc., ultimately
do succumb to bankruptcy or reorganization. In these proceedings, a simpler
and more effective deterrent to insider trading during insolvency is the power
of the bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, to limit or subordinate any
claim.32 Though the court refused to exercise this power in the Calton Cres-
cent case,33 deprivation of profits is a well-established technique for curbing
310-21 (1937) and pt. III, 151 (1936). Thus, whether the purchases in the Caiton Crescent
case were motivated by inside information or anticipation of a post-war inflation of real
estate values could not be established.
Moreover, in common law suits for fraudulent misrepresentation most jurisdictions
adopt the unpredictable "special circumstances" doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court
in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). According to this rule, insides 'ieed disclose
inside information only when the court considers the circumstances of tv transaction par-
ticularly inequitable for the security holder. Such circumstances have included prospective
merger, Mc2lynn v. Peterson, 186 Wis. 442, 201 N.AV. 272 (1925) ; assured sale of corporate
assets, Gammon v. Dain, 238 Mich. 30, 212 N.V. 957 (1927) ; impending declaration of divi-
dends, Hotchldss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P2d 531 (1932).
2& SEC Regulation X-10-B5 (SEC Release No. 3230, 1942). Although the standards
of conduct imposed by this relatively new rule upon parties to a security transaction are as
yet unexplored, material omissions would certainly seem to fall within the scope of the
rule. For discussions of liability under Rule X-10-B5, see Rubin & Feldman, Statutory
Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Inside Information b_ InIdcrs, 95 U. oF PA. L REv. 468
(1947) ; Note, 59 HAv. L. Rav. 769 (1946).
29. See 62 HARv. L. REv. 1391, 1392 (1949).
30. See, e.g., Walker-Lucas-Hudson Oil Co. v. Hudson, 168 Ark. 1093, 1103, 272
S.W. 836, 838 (1925) ; SPrELuAx, CORPORATE Dnu-roas § 191 (1st ed. 1931).
31. Prevailing doctrine considers the corporate director a fiduciary to stockholders or
creditors as a class, but not as individuals. The distinction is unrealistic. See Bmun- &
MIEANS, THE MODERN CORPOATION AND PRIVATE PROPzar, 222-7, 277-87 (1934).
32. Disallowance of claims is specifically authorized in all proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Act § 2, 30 STAT. 545 (1S98), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1946) (bankruptcy proceedings) ;
§196, 52 STAT. 893 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §596 (1946) (Chapter X proceedings); §336, 52
STAT. 908 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 736 (1946) (Chapter XI proceedings).
33. In part this reluctance stemmed from a recognition that limitation would not bene-
fit those bondholders from whom the insiders purchased their claims. 173 F2d 944, 950
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